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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KIRT OVERSON I
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 15470

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, aka USF&G,
an insurance company,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Nature of the Case
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Appellant to determine whether a fire loss to a building he was
constructing was covered by his policy of insurance with
Respondent.
Disposition in the Lower Court
This case was tried to a jury, with the Honorable J. Harlan
Burns presiding.

At the conclusion of Appellant's case, the

court granted Respondent's motion for directed verdict against
Appellant, finding as a matter of law that the insurance
policy in question was not ambiguous and that exclusions
K(3) and (0) of the policy excluded Appellant's loss from
co'1erase.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Relief Sought on Appeal
Respondent requests that the Judgment below be affirmed.
Statement of Facts
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

Appel-

lant's statement of facts is incomplete, however, and therefore,
a complete recitation of the facts of this case follows.
On or about August 1, 1973, Appellant purchased a comprehensive general liability policy of insurance from Respondent (Tr. p. 3; Exhibit P-1).

Said policy of insurance con-

tained certain exclusions which excluded certain types of
loss from coverage under the policy.

Two of these exclusionar; '

provisions were relied upon at trial by Respondent.
Said exclusions read as follows:
This insurance does not apply:

*
(k)

*

*

to property damage to

*

*

*

(3)
property in the care, custody
or control of the Insured or as to
which the Insured is for any purpose
exercising physical control;

*

*

*

(o)
to property damage to work performed by
or on behalf of the named Insured arising out
of the work or any portion thereof, or out of
materials, parts or equipment furnished in
connection therewith;
(Exhibit P-1).
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(Tr. p.8),

Neither the policy nor the exclusions were ever read by Appellant.

(Tr. p. 8).
The instant action arises from a fire loss which occurred

on September 3, 1973.

(Tr. p. 4).

The building that burned

was a quonset-type steel building which was to be used for
potato storage when completed.

(Tr. pp. 10, 11; Ex. P-2).

The owner of the real property upon which the building was
situated was Triple "C" Farms of McCormack, Utah.

(Tr. p. 4).

At the time of the loss, Triple "C" Farms had not taken possession of the building.

(Tr. p. 36).

The steel for the building, footings and foundations,
electrical work and some interior ductwork were to be provided
by Stephenson's, Inc., an implement dealer from Holden, Utah.
(Tr. pp. 13-15).

Appellant had contracted to provide the

labor necessary to erect the building and to furnish and
apply the foam insulation used therein.

(Tr. pp . 13 , 1 7, 2 0) .

As of the date of loss, Appellant has no recollection as
to whether any electrical work or work by persons other than
him or his employees had been done on the building that burned.
(Tr. p. 33).

He did remember that others had poured the foot-

ings and foundations, but admitted that such work was completed six or eight weeks prior to the date of loss.
p. 34).

(Tr.

On the date of loss, the only persons working on

or about the building that burned were two employees of
Appellant, Harold Helgesen and Billie VanDeVanter.
pp. 34, 35, 42, 54).

(Tr.

On that day, Messrs. Helgesen and
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vanDeVanter had been directed by Appellant to enlarge a
vented louvre in the ends of the building.

(Tr. p. 47).

They proceeded to accomplish this task by remouing one of
the metal panels constituting part of the building end wan
I

cutting a larger hole in it, replacing the small louvre
with a larger one and replacing the panel on the building.
(Tr. pp. 49-51).

They had removed the panel from the east

end of the building without incident but when attempting ~
remove the panel from the west end of the building the threads
on one of the connecting bolts stripped and it could not be
removed conventionally.

(Tr. p. 51).

In an effort to remove

the bolt, Mr. VanDeVanter obtained an acetelyne cutting torch
from a nearby van and proceeded to cut the
stripped bolt.

(Id.)

head off the

Before the bolt was severed by the

torch, the flame ignited the polyurethane foam insulation
in the building and the building burned to the ground within
minutes.

(Tr. pp. 52, 54).

The foam insulation was fur-

nished and applied by Appellanc.

(Tr. pp. 1 7, 2 0) .

Subsequent to the loss, a new building was erected on
the site.

(Tr. p. 29).

Appellant for the loss.

Thereafter, Stephenson's, Inc. sued
(Tr. p. 30).

Appellant tendered

defense of that case to Respondent for defense but the te~&
was refused and coverage denied.

(Tr. p. 30).

The instant

action was commenced in the District Court of Millard County
on October 11, 1974.

(R.

p. A-1).

-4-
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Argument
POINT I
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF APPELLANT'S
CASE.
Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court may direct a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case.

It is generally

held that such a ruling is proper when there is no reasonable disagreement on the questions to be presented to the
jury.

Boskovich v. Utah Construction co., 123 Utah 387, 259

P.2d 885 (1953).
In this case the facts concerning the incident are
undisputed.
The only issues remaining were issues of contract interpretation.
trial judge.

Those questions could only be decided by the
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe co. v. Haish

Utah Corp., 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956).

The general

rule has been stated as follows:
Interpretation of a written contract is
usually a question of law for the court.
If its
terms are clear and unambiguous, sununary judgment
is proper.
Even where some ambiguity exists in
the contract, resolution of the ambiguity is still
a question of law for the court unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify the ambiguity.
Central Credit Collection Control Corp. v.
Grayson, 7 Wash. App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972) ·
Appellant indicates that because summary judgment had
previously been denied there must have existed a fact
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question.
case.

This court ha~ recently held that such i's not the

Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., No. 14931, filed

December 2, 1977.

In that case, this court made it clear

that preliminary rulings do not rise to the level of res
judicata or stare decisis.

Therefore, a directed verdict

can be properly granted even where summary judgment has been
denied.
POINT II
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THE CLAUSES
OF THE INSURANCE POLICY TO BE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
A.

Generally.
Appellant, in the abstract, claims the exclusionary

clauses relied upon by Respondent are ambiguous.

No specific

ambiguity is claimed and no specific conflicting interpretation is advanced by Appellant as being his reading of these
policy provisions; and indeed, no specifics can be advanced
by Appellant because he didn't even read the policy.

It is

impossible for Appellant to rely on his interpretation of the
policy for coverage when he had no interpretation of the
policy to begin with.

In essence, there is no evidence in

this case of conflicting intent, and there being no such
evidence, there can be no ambiguity as a matter of law.
Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 518 F.2d 1026 (D.C. cir.
1973).
B.

Care, Custody or Control.
Courts have extensively interpreted the provision in
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this policy of insurance excluding from coverage of damage
to property in the care, custody or control of the insured.
The clause has generally been found to be clear and unambiguous.

62 A.L.R. 2d 1242; Madden v. Vitamilk Dairy, Inc., 367

P.2d 127 (Wash. 1961); Hill v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty, 348 S.W. 2d 512 (Tenn. 1961).

In Hill, supra, the

court stated:
We think the exclusion clause of the policy
which provides that said policy does not offer
indemnity for damage to "property in the care,
custody or control of property as to which the
insured for any purpose is exercising control,"
is clear and unambiguous and, as has been stated
in many cases, the courts will not create an
ambiguity where none exists. 348 S.W. 2d at 515.
The case law has developed four rules for determining
whether the property was within the care, custody or control
of the insured.

They are:

First, that possessory, not pro-

prietary, control is required; second, if the property
damaged is only incidental to the work the insured may not
have care, custody or control; third, the insured will
likely have care, custody or control if he has the property
under his immediate supervision; fourth, care, custody and
control is more readily found where the property is a necessary element of the work as opposed to being merely incidental.
62 A.L.R. 2d 1242; Madden v. Vitamilk Dairy, Inc., supra;
Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, supra.
In applying those tests to this case, the trier of fact
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could only conclude that the plaintiff had care, custody or
control of the building in question.

Appellant had the

building in his possessory control during its construction
for a period of six to eight weeks before the fire.

The

building was not merely incidental to the work being done,
but rather was the sole object of the work.

Appellant had

the building under his immediate supervision.

Only his

employees were working on the building on the day of the
fire and no significant work had been done by any other
person during the preceding six to eight weeks.
Finally, the building was a necessary element of the
work, indeed it was the only element of the work.
This Court in American Casualty Co. v. Pearson, 7 Utah
2d 37, 317 P.2d 954

(1954), adopted the majority view that

where the damaged property is under the supervision of the
insured and is a necessary element of the work, the proper~
is deemed to be in the care, custody or control of the insured.
The insured's employee in Pearson, supra, while attaching a
trailer hitch to a car in the regular course of business of
the insured' s garage, damaged the automobile when he put a
welding torch to the gasoline tank.

The customer-owner of

the car was present, observing as well as assisting in the
progress of the work.

This court, nonetheless, held as a
.

d

matter of law that the car was in the care, custo Y

or control

of the insured's employee; therefore, the insurer was not
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liable under the terms of the policy.
As Appellant points out in his brief, some courts have
held the care, custody or control exclusion to be ambiguous.
In analyzing those cases it is apparent that rather than the
language being ambiguous, the facts of the case present a
close question when the above tests are applied.

For example,

in Arrigo's Fleet Service, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 54
Mich. App. 482, 221 N.W. 2d 206 (1974) the plaintiff contracted to repair a broken axle on a large cargo trailer.
This work did not require access to the cargo area.

A fire

started in the cargo area and the court had to decide whether
this portion of the trailer was in the plaintiff's care,
custody or control.

Similarly, in Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co. v. Haas, 422 S.W. 316 (Mo. 1968) the plaintiff was exterminating bugs when an explosion caused damage to the house.
The court in that case seemed to recognize that in close fact
situations it would be difficult to decide whether the property
was in the case, custody or control of the plaintiff.
These cases indicate that the language of this clause
is clear and unambiguous and only where the facts present a
close question have courts resorted to labeling the clause
ambiguous.

In this case, the facts are clear:

Appellant

had the building under his care, custody and control.

Indeed,

it is anomalous for Appellant to claim that the policy was
ambiguous when he has admitted never reading beyond the cover
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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page of the policy.
C.

Damage "Arising Out Of" the Work or Materials.
The policy of insurance also excludes coverage for

property damage arising out of the work or materials used.
An excellent case on the subject is Engine Services, Inc. v.
Reliance Insurance Co., 487 P.2d 474 (Wyo. 1971).

In that

case the plaintiff undertook to rebuild a heavy engine.

In

doing so, the plaintiff's employee improperly installed a
bearing causing damage to the engine.

The plaintiff sought

coverage under its insurance policy, a policy containing
language similar to clause (o)

in this case.

The court there
,;o1

denied the relief stating first that the language

wa~a~~~

ous and thus:
[I]t has uniformly been held that a liability policy with an exclusion clause such as
the present does not insure any obligation of
the policyholder to repair or replace his own
defective work or defective product. Quoting,
Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 179 So. 2d 496, 497-498 (La.
1965).
487 P.2d at 476.
In the instant case the loss falls squarely within the
provisions of this unambiguous exclusion.

The damage in

question was property damage to work performed by the insured (erecting and insulating building) which arose out of
work done by the insured's employees (cutting bolt and removing louvre) and materials supplied by the insured (foam

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

insulation) .

All of these facts are undisputed.

There are

no issues related to construction or application of this
provision.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that a fact issue

did exist on the care, custody and control exclusion, application of this exclusion would still require a directed verdict against Appellant.
Under these circumstances the trial judge had no alternative but to direct a verdict for Respondent at the close
of the Appellant's case.
D.

Appellant Purchased the Wrong Insurance
The very heart of this dispute over coverage is the fact

that Appellant did not purchase the appropriate policy of
insurance.

The builders risk policy, purchased by contractors

in similar situations, would have provided coverage for this
incident.

Having failed to purchase the necessary insurance

he now attempts to obtain extended coverage under the liability policy previously purchased.
Conclusion
The trial court was correct in directing a verdict for
Respondent at the close of Appellant's case.

The facts

surrounding the incident in question are undisputed.

Apply-

ing the language of the policy to the facts of this case,
only one conclusion could logically be reached.

Appellant

had no insurance coverage for the incident.
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DATED this

~

/'Z-

-~

day of April, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

nt
ENSEN & MARTINEAU
or Respondent

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the
I personally delivered two (2)

/,;? t:!- day of April, 1978,

copies of the foregoing Brief

to Philip R. Fishler, Esq., Strong

&

Hanni, 604 Boston Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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